Abstract
Introduction
For some, it has almost become a commonplace that the EC's reputation as a subject of the WTO legal system is far from irreproachable.
1 Indeed, its refusal to effectively implement adverse rulings in a number of well-publicized cases, such as, for instance, Bananas and Beef Hormones, has been widely scrutinized in the legal doctrine. Furthermore, from another perspective, inflexible positions taken by the EC in the framework of the WTO dispute settlement proceedings have highlighted some of the deficiencies in the textual language and in the procedures of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (hereinafter the DSU), thus calling for its review (currently still under way). To cite a few examples, 2 this has occurred in relation to: a) the establishment of a reasonable period of time for the implementation of Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings (pursuant to DSU Article 21.3), in particular as to the need to harmonize the notion of 'shortest period possible' with the lengthy legislative procedures provided for by the EC Treaty; 3 b) the use and content of the 'status reports', whereby the losing party is required to describe the specific measures that will be adopted to implement the ruling; In this case, the arbitrator called upon to establish the reasonable period of time, while stating that this period 'should be the shortest possible within the legal system of the Member', nonetheless considered that an important 'particular circumstance' to be taken into account was the complexity of the EC's implementation process. The consequent decision not to shorten the usual 15-month period posed the problem that lengthy legislative procedures, such as those provided for by the EC Treaty, might represent an invisible 'non-tariff trade barrier' for all those interested in a timely accomplishment of the recommendations and rulings issued by the DSB. The conduct displayed by the Community during the reasonable period of time in the Bananas and Beef Hormones cases has shown how little use the 'status report' may be in the absence of any DSU provision determining: (a) how detailed report must be and (b) whether the losing Party is required to describe what specific measures will be adopted to implement the ruling. In the first case see EC-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Status Report by the European Communities, WT/DS27/17 of 13 July 1998. In the Beef Hormones case, the EC refused to lift its ban from the very beginning of the implementation period. Furthermore, the EC, apart from stating that its ban was definitively to be maintained, used its status reports to give account only of the scientific studies that had been undertaken (EC- Behaving in this way, the EC disregarded the contrary warning given by the reasonable period arbitrator in his ruling, according to which 'it would not be in keeping
The two understandings provide for phased implementation steps: by July 2001, the EC must adopt a new licensing system for bananas based on historical reference periods; by January 2002, the EC is to shift an additional 100,000 tonnes of bananas into a tariff quota to be open to bananas of Latin American origin (with reference to which US distributors have a substantial historical share); by 1 January 2006, the EC is committed to the introduction of a tariff-only regime for banana imports. In addition to Bananas and Beef Hormones, the EC has to date (as of 31 July 2004) been found in breach of WTO obligations in five other instances, according to a report adopted by the DSB (under Article 16.4 in combination with Article 17.14 of the DSU). In the Bed-linen and the Iron Tube cases, the legislative measures adopted by the Community have been considered by India and Brazil, respectively, as failing to comply with the recommendations of the DSB. 10 In the Sardines case, the EC and Peru resolved the dispute on a mutually satisfactory basis following the adoption of Commission Regulation (EC) 1181/2003 of 2 July 2003. 11 In the Poultry Products case, the EC adopted its Regulation No. 439/99 on 6 March 1999 with a view to implementing one of the two recommendations of the DSB, and both parties expressed their will to find a mutually agreed solution. 12 As for the recent Tariff Preferences case, the reasonable period of time for implementation has yet to be established. 13 This cursory overview shows that the EC's implementation record, though not exemplary, does not add up to a generally non-complying approach. In the majority of cases, in fact, the Community has declared its willingness to comply with the DSB's rulings, and has adopted implementation measures, albeit with exceedingly lengthy delays (measures adopted after the expiry of the reasonable period of time), and not without contestation as to their consistency with the adverse decision. On the other hand, the record seems to reflect an attitude that, in accordance with the view traditionally maintained by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) from International Fruit to DSB (see WT/DS26/22 and WT/DS48/20 of 28 October 2003). At the DSB meeting of 7 November, both the US and Canada observed that the measures taken by the EC were still not WTO-consistent (see WT/ DSB/M/157 of 18 December 2003, at 7-8). Accordingly, the US and Canada refused to remove the retaliation measures adopted against the EC. Portugal, finds its cornerstone in the principle of negotiations with a view to achieving mutually satisfactory solutions, even beyond the limits set by the DSU. The number of disputes settled by the Community, alone or jointly with its Member States, by means of a mutually agreed solution, supports this view.
14 Following these premises, the purpose of this paper is to analyse what impact the EC courts in their interpretation of the WTO system has had on the EC's contentious practice, in fine tuning with the stand taken by the political bodies. 15 The jurisprudence at issue here, essentially that regarding the legal status and effect of WTO law within the EC legal order, has been widely examined, and often harshly criticized, in the literature. 16 The ECJ has been repeatedly accused of underrating or misjudging the radical innovations introduced by the Marrakech Agreements, adopting an interpretation contra legem that ignores the transformation of the earlier 'power-oriented' GATT 1947 into the new 'rule-oriented' WTO (a transformation mainly attested to by the innovative 'quasi-jurisdictional' character of the dispute settlement mechanism).
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These critiques are coupled with those aimed at the EC's conduct within the WTO dispute settlement system, making the link between the case-law of the EC's courts and the practice of the Community's political bodies a worthy object of analysis.
Section 2 will consider the 'interpretative' practice developed by the Community courts, in harmony with the positions of the political bodies, to determine from it the possible ratio underlying the overall EC approach to the WTO system. Notwithstanding the undoubted interest provoked by the 'direct effect' issue, our aim here is not to critically assess the position of the ECJ, but to use the words of the Luxembourg judges as a guide to EC practice. In Section 3, then, we will attempt to analyse how this vision has been put into practice, namely to what extent the EC's conduct in the framework of the WTO dispute settlement process has been influenced by the 'scope for manoeuvre' argument. As will become clear, an approach mainly aimed at preserving the balance of mutual advantages between the WTO Members queries the role played in the dispute settlement mechanism by the agreements between parties, especially in those cases in which the DSU does not provide for mutually agreed solutions. At a higher level of analysis, then, this is strictly connected with another widely debated issue, namely the nature of the legal obligations entered into by the WTO Member States. This problem will be briefly dealt with in the final section.
Prologue. The 'Scope for Manoeuvre' Argument
It is established case-law that, in view of their nature and structure, the WTO Agreement and its annexes, including GATT 1947, do not in principle form part of the rules by which the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (CFI) review the legality of acts adopted by Community institutions under Article 230 of the EC Treaty (before amendment, Article 173 EC). Furthermore, WTO agreements do not create rights which individuals can rely on directly before the courts (i.e., they are devoid of direct effect) and any infringement of them will not give rise to non-contractual liability on the part of the Community. 27 or where the Community measures refer expressly to the precise provisions of the WTO agreements, is it up to the EC's courts to review the legality of the Community measure in question in the light of WTO rules. The only adjunctive type of effect which the European courts recognize in relation to the WTO rules is linked to the principle of consistent interpretation, by virtue of which the legislation of both the Community and its Member States is to be interpreted in the light of, and in accordance with, the EC's international obligations. This principle, after having been repeatedly applied to GATT 1947, 28 has been extended to the WTO agreements, and specifically to the TRIPs, in the Hermès and Christian Dior rulings. 29 Indirectly, furthermore, private parties may also avail themselves of the WTO rules in the framework of Regulation 3286/94 (the so-called Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR)), 30 establishing the procedures to be followed by the Community institutions to address the complaints of private parties or an EC Member State alleging that a third WTO party has violated the obligations undertaken towards the Community. The TBR, which represents the Community response to the US Trade Act 1974, as subsequently amended, 31 allows trade operators' complaints to be channelled through an administrative mechanism that, at any rate, ascribes mainly to the EC Commission the choice to either bring a complaint before the WTO supervisory organs or to terminate/suspend the investigation, or alternatively to seek an agreed solution. Therefore, the TBR -at least partly -seems to share the function and the nature of the traditional diplomatic protection remedy provided for by general international law. TBR-like twin 26 Supra note 18, at para. 49. mechanisms have also been set up in the field of anti-dumping 32 and for subsidized imports.
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The hypotheses outlined above mark the boundary beyond which WTO law is not permitted to have effects in the EC legal system. Each of them represents a different example of the kind of 'indirect effect' described in the WTO panel's report on US-Section 301-310. 34 In fact, WTO norms do not seem to be able to produce direct effects in the EC legal system per se, for the very simple reason that between them and private parties there is always the interposition of the EC implementing norm. In other words, WTO rules may be invoked by private parties before EC tribunals only through the filter of a legislative measure or an administrative action aimed at implementing the WTO rule in the EC legal order, thus performing a 'secondary transposition', after the first one automatically provided for by Article 300, paragraph 7 of the EC Treaty. 35 By virtue of this latter disposition, in fact, EC political bodies have to 'ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements', pursuant to Article XVI(4) of the Agreement establishing the WTO. This means that WTO Members have undertaken an obligation of result, remaining free to decide how to comply with it, and therefore whether or not to recognize the direct effect of WTO law.
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Thus far we have seen the results reached by the EC courts in their case-law as to the status of WTO law in the Community's legal system. However, as I have already stated in the Introduction, the purpose of this section is not to address the legal soundness of these results but to follow, almost dogmatically, the ECJ line of reasoning, particularly that which emerges in the Portugal ruling. My aim here is to sketch out the general perspective of the EC institutions on the WTO system.
Focusing then on Portugal, it has often been pointed out that the rationale underlying the ECJ judgement is twofold: legal and political. The legal argument is that WTO rules are neither self-executing nor unconditional. The political one is based on the lack of reciprocity. Let us analyse the two lines of the ECJ reasoning separately, starting from the 'policy' argument.
It has been said that the ECJ in Portugal 'has finally shown its hand', 37 by declaring the supposedly real reason for the denial of direct effect, namely the lack of reciprocity. In brief, the EC position on this issue may be viewed as a form of lawful retortion (not a countermeasure, as the effect of WTO rules is not mandated by the WTO agreements), in response to the equal stand taken by the most important trade partners of the Community (the United States, Japan and Canada), where WTO rules are considered as not directly effective.
38 This is especially the case as the WTO agreements are still based, like GATT 1947, 'on the principle of negotiations with a view to entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements', an element that, in the Court's view, justifies a departure from the principle stated in Kupferberg, valid only for 'asymmetrical' agreements. According to Kupferberg, in fact, the circumstance that 'the courts of the other party do not recognize such direct application is not in itself such to constitute a lack of reciprocity in the implementation of the agreement'.
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A different stand, continues the Court, might lead to a 'disuniform application of the WTO rules', an expression that directly recalls that 'major imbalance' already feared by the Commission in the proposal that led to the adoption of the Council's Directive 94/800. Therefore, as the WTO system is based on the principle of negotiations, the ECJ may not tie the Community political bodies' hands; indeed, it is necessary to leave them room for manoeuvre.
The ruling, therefore, confirms the more general tendency to prevent courts from administering reciprocity, a matter which must be left to the political bodies. 40 It makes clear that the whole problem of direct effect is, essentially, a matter of balance of power among the EC bodies. 41 This said, let us turn back to an analysis of the first part of the Court's reasoning, which is more relevant to our aims. Firstly, provided that WTO agreements do not dictate what effect the provisions of the agreements are to have in the legal orders of the contracting parties, 42 it is for the ECJ to decide the question. 43 Second, the Court, with a view to establishing the status of WTO norms, undertakes, consistently with the 'context approach' followed in International Fruit, 45 an analysis of the purpose and nature of the subject agreement. 46 In its view, notwithstanding the major changes brought about by the Uruguay Round Agreements, particularly by virtue of the strengthening of the system of safeguards and the mechanism for resolving disputes, the notion developed for the 'old' GATT almost 30 years before, namely that the system accords 'considerable importance to negotiation between the parties', is still valid for the WTO. This is tantamount to saying that, due to the nature and the structure of the agreements under consideration, WTO obligations are still not unconditional, and, therefore, they are not apt to produce direct effects, as the Court had already stated with regard to the old GATT in Germany v Council. 47 To prove the validity of this view, then, the Court decided to hit hard, i.e. launching a frontal attack on the 'jewel in the Crown', the new quasi-jurisdictional dispute settlement system, the much praised innovation which is called upon to guarantee the compulsory character [1987] ECR 3719, at para. 14, the Court stated that: 'A provision in an agreement concluded by the Community with non-member countries must be regarded as being directly applicable when, regard being had to its wording and the purpose and nature of the agreement itself, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its implementation or effects, to the adoption of any subsequent measure'. The same consideration is repeated, e.g., in Case C-432/92, Anastasiou and Others, [1994] ECR I-3087, at para. 23. 46 On the contrast between a 'context approach' that avoids any analysis of the specific provisions alleged to have direct effect, and the 'textual approach' followed by the ECJ of the overall WTO system. The aim is to demonstrate that negotiations still play a significant, even if not exclusive, role (as was the case at the time of GATT 1947, when the adoption of panel rulings was subject to positive consensus), also in the field of WTO dispute settlement. And here the ECJ has been widely accused of having misfired, giving an erroneous interpretation of the DSU rules governing the executive phase of the adjudicative process. The main critique moved towards the Court's reasoning is that by misinterpreting the DSU provisions the ECJ has reached the incorrect conclusion that compensation and toleration of retaliation are suitable, albeit temporary, alternatives to full and immediate compliance. In other words, the ECJ seems to imply that compliance is negotiable, if provisionally, in the WTO. Consequently, a losing party in the DSU proceedings could legitimately go for the 'pay-option', namely to gain licence to continue to violate (i.e., not to implement the DSB-adopted reports in order to bring the offending measure into compliance with WTO obligations), by agreeing on an 'erga omnes' compensation or by accepting a retaliation on the part of the winning party. The remark is foundational for the 'plan for action' devised by the Court: if a party may choose at its discretion between full compliance or alternative forms of prospective reparation, even if only temporary (but often 'provisoire qui dure' 48 ), then, again, it is imperative for the Community to safeguard the 'scope for manoeuvre' of its organs called on to negotiate compliance with this system. Consequently, the very essence of the WTO is that of being a forum for negotiation aiming at a system of reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements.
As is self-evident, what is really at stake here is the very nature of the legal obligations arising from both WTO substantive norms and DSB rulings. It might, in fact, be easily inferred from the ECJ reasoning that WTO rules and DSB decisions -negotiable, even if only temporarily, by Contracting Parties -are not cogent and do not create absolute or immediate obligations, as expressly argued by Advocate General Mischo in the Atlanta case. 49 The majority of the doctrine has upheld the absolutely binding character of WTO obligations, critically appraising both the Court's reasoning and its conclusions. The same kind of critique has been more recently formulated in the Opinion of Advocate General Alber in the Biret International case. In this Opinion, in fact, it was openly stated that, following adoption of a recommendation or of a decision by the DSB, there is no room for negotiation or for discretion on the part of the Contracting Parties. There can be no choice between complying with the DSB ruling or compensating for/ tolerating retaliation. In the long run, there is no alternative to implementation of the DSB-adopted reports.
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Let us now turn to analyse whether and to what extent the programme for action devised in the ECJ case-law has been consistently put into practice.
The 'Scope for Manoeuvre' Argument to the Proof of Practice
As was noted in the Introduction above, the Community, in the Bananas 54 and Beef Hormones cases, 55 refused to implement timely adverse rulings, preferring to face substantial retaliation on the part of some of the complainants.
It might be maintained that the stand long kept by the EC in these two notorious disputes is an evident example of that kind of 'pay-option' that the ECJ is alleged to have justified in its case-law. However, as will be seen, the scope for manoeuvre used by the Community bodies has gone well beyond this.
Before addressing this question, some preliminary remarks are necessary. As pointed out in the doctrine, the WTO dispute settlement system is of a 'mixed' nature. 56 On the one hand, it has inherited the acquis of the GATT (pursuant to DSU Article 3.1), and thus the diplomatic and consensual procedures provided for by Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947. Accordingly, DSU Article 3.7 affirms that: 'A solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred'. To achieve this aim, the DSU mandates a preliminary diplomatic phase based on consultations. On the other hand, the DSU introduces a new two-tiered adjudicative phase based on proceedings before impartial organs (a panel appointed on a case-by-case basis, and, where its report is contested, the permanent Appellate Body), comprising acknowledged experts sitting in their personal capacity, whose recommendations are adopted (acquiring binding force) by the DSB almost automatically, thanks to the inversion of the rule of consensus (from positive into negative). 57 Nonetheless, the fact that the decisions of the adjudicative bodies (Panel and Appellate Body) are adopted by a political body (the DSB), justifies in principle the caution exercised in commonly qualifying the Marrakech dispute settlement system as 'quasi-judicial'. 58 Until the conclusion of the panel phase, the DSU accepts and aims at regulating the inherent tension existing between the consensual and the adjudicative method of dispute settlement. Indeed, the DSU, under Article 4, provides for a compulsory preliminary phase based on consultations between the litigants. Mutually agreed solutions may be reached even during the panel procedure; to this end, pursuant to DSU Article 11, 'Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution'. An interim review phase has also been established to prompt parties towards an amicable settlement, prior to publicizing the panel's verdict.
With a view to preserving the overall coherence of the system, then, the DSU establishes two rules to harmonize consensual and quasi-jurisdictional means of settlement. Firstly, under DSU Article 3.5: 'All solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements . . . shall be consistent with those agreements and shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any Member under those agreements, nor impede the attainment of any objective of those agreements.' Second, under DSU Article 3.6, there is a duty to notify the DSB of '[m]utually agreed solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements.' It is noteworthy that, while DSU Article 3.5 requests that whatever mutually agreed solution decided upon be consistent with WTO covered agreements (and the same request is formulated in other DSU provisions providing for mutually agreed solutions), DSU Article 3.4 establishes that: 'Recommendations or rulings made by the DSB shall be aimed at achieving a satisfactory settlement of the matter in accordance with the rights and obligations under this Understanding and under the covered agreements.' Moreover, recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements (DSU Articles 3.2 and 19.2). The space not fortuitously left open between agreements being compatible and DSB rulings that must be in accordance with the covered agreements (in the French text the words used are, respectively, compatible and conforme) allows the litigant parties the scope for manoeuvre necessary for finding an amicable solution.
Subsequently, then, at a certain stage of the procedure, namely after the presentation of the panel's report and its adoption by the DSB, the DSU seems to resolve the above-mentioned tension between consensual and quasi-jurisdictional tools of dispute settlement in favour of the latter. As stated by DSU Article 3.7: 'In the absence of a mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered agreements.' Therefore, compensation should be resorted to only if the immediate withdrawal of the offending measure is impracticable and, in any case, only as a temporary redress pending the withdrawal of the contested measure. Authorized retaliation is, in the end, the 'last resort'. Neither of these two temporary solutions, which, as already said, are aimed at applying pressure to obtain implementation and, in the meantime, to avoid increasing the damage suffered by other Members (provided that retaliation has only prospective effects), absolves the losing party from the duty to implement the recommendations and decisions adopted by the DSB.
At least, that is the theory. In practice, however, particularly regarding the European Community, the consensual tools of dispute settlement continue to play a significant role even after the stage in which the procedure has gone through the judiciary channels. States stipulate agreements of different types to regulate procedural or substantive aspects of their disputes, even after the adoption of panel and Appellate Body reports by the DSB. This is not to say that the new quasi-jurisdictional procedures do not work properly as they were intended to, or that DSU provisions or DSB rulings are regularly disregarded. All in all, the DSU system performs reasonably well, and it is not our aim to question this. What is intended here is to note that consensual tools operate in different ways, even beyond the limits set up by the DSU, and with a variety of functions.
This said, and turning now to EC practice, we may finally examine the range of 'scope for manoeuvre', with a view to investigating, in particular, its 'dark side', namely those examples of conduct that do not find an appropriate legal basis within the DSU.
To clarify this, let us now investigate what role the agreement between parties plays throughout the dispute settlement process. To this end, the different kinds of mutually agreed solutions found in the practice will be divided into four categories: a) agreements infra ordinem, i.e. expressly permitted by the DSU, insomuch as they represent the positive result of either the preliminary 'diplomatic' phase or of the consultations held during the panel procedure; b) agreements infra ordinem concluded under DSU Articles 22.2 and 22.8; c) agreements extra ordinem, i.e., not provided for by the DSU text, and praeter legem, whose aim is to fill the lacunae in a treaty; d) agreements extra ordinem and contra legem.
Before illustrating the different types of agreements, it must be noted that we refer here to a relatively 'broad' notion of agreement, as devised, at international level, by the International Court of Justice, 59 and at the Community level, by the ECJ. 60 The practice of both courts, in fact, bears out that the formal designation of an understanding between two states does not influence, per se, its legal nature. To determine whether an act or document constitutes a binding agreement in the public international law sense, or amounts only to a political commitment, the analysis shall not be limited to the form or instrument in which the transaction is embodied. Instead, the ICJ, in particular, has always given priority to the nature of the act or transaction, to its actual terms and to the particular circumstances in which it was drawn up, with a view to verifying whether the parties intended to undertake binding obligations proper. The key element is, therefore, represented by the will of the parties, 61 as it may be reconstructed on the basis of the previously stated criteria. This remark is necessary to approach the multiform world of the WTO 'mutually agreed solutions', a deliberately vague expression that is aimed at encompassing the different national procedures of treaty-making.
Let us now proceed to analyse the function and the content of each of the categories of agreements. This will be done, in line with the aims of this article, by referring mainly to the EC's practice in the WTO contentious system. As the Community is one of the most frequent users of this system, 62 its practice may provide for a reliable sample of more general trends. 
A Agreements infra-ordinem, Concluded during Consultations or Prior to the End of the Panel Proceedings
As already stated, this category directly reflects the privilege accorded to mutually agreed solutions, at least in the first phase of the DSU proceedings. 63 As it is expressly contemplated by the DSU as the preferable solution, it is probably the least helpful among the four categories here at issue in investigating the 'dark side' of the 'scope for manoeuvre'. To this specific end, it is mostly useful for verifying the EC's compliance with the two requirements imposed by DSU Articles 3.5 and 3.6: namely, consistency of the mutually agreed solutions with the covered agreements and the duty to notify their conclusion to the DSB (the so-called 'transparency rule').
During the first years of DSU practice, the Community stipulated a wide range of agreements falling into this first category. 64 In some cases, there has been undoubted respect for the two above-mentioned conditions, as, for instance, in the Scallops case, a dispute which began under the GATT 1947 system dispute, and was settled through an exchange of letters after the parties (the EC as respondent, Canada, Peru and Chile as complainants) read the interim report issued by the panel. 65 In some other circumstances, on the other hand, the EC has been less observant. A case in point is the transparency rule, 'a cornerstone principle of the multilateral trading system', 66 for instance, which has been clearly disregarded in a number of cases. In a system where the only subjects who may legitimately bring a violation complaint are contracting parties whose benefits are nullified or impaired, 67 69 In the Korea -Telecommunications case, for instance, the EC Commission, after concluding the negotiations, undertook to suspend its WTO action and formally to end the WTO dispute procedure. Then, the EC Commission and Korea informed the DSB that they had reached a mutually agreed solution, but they did not present the text of the agreement. 70 Much the same happened in the dispute regarding the Japan -Procurement of a Navigation Satellite case. 71 Here, the United States reacted by requesting information on the mutually agreed solution and, thus, only subsequently, obtained a Joint Statement by the EC and Japan illustrating the content of the solution agreed. 72 In the dispute on the US Textiles Rules, the exchange of letters between the United States Trade Representative and the Vice-President of the European Commission, Sir Leon Brittan, was not presented at the time. 73 This prompted the protests of those countries that had asked to be included in consultations, 74 protests that eventually led to the notification six months later. 75 Even more interestingly, regarding Japan -Telecommunications Equipment, no mutually agreed solution has ever been notified. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the case was amicably settled by the parties. 76 The same seems to have happened in the EC -Duties on Imports of
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On the absence of 'naked justice' mechanisms in the DSU system see Ligustro, 'La soluzione delle controversie', in Picone and Ligustro, supra note 38, at 588. Grains case. 77 It is not surprising that two of the agreements concluded in the abovementioned cases, namely in Korea -Telecommunications and Japan -Telecommunications Equipment, were deemed inconsistent with WTO law.
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B Agreements infra-ordinem Provided for by DSU Articles 22.2 and 22.8
It has already been said that, once the DSB has adopted the panel/Appellate Body reports, the ruling becomes binding on the losing party, which is compelled to comply with it by modifying or withdrawing the WTO-inconsistent measure. In the event of protracted non-compliance, parties may agree on a mutually acceptable compensation or, as an extrema ratio, the complaining Member may ultimately resort to retaliation, requesting authorization from the DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements. At any rate, under DSU Article 22.8, the suspension of concessions or other obligations is temporary and may last only until such time as: a) the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement has been removed, or b) the Member that must implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the nullification or impairment of benefits, or, else c) a mutually satisfactory solution is reached. In any case, the DSB continues to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings.
This considered, let us now seek examples in EC practice of agreements that might be framed within DSU Articles 22.2 and 22.8.
Regarding the first category, an example may be found in the framework of the mutually agreed solution 'on modalities for implementation', concluded in the Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages case 79 by the Community, as complainant, with Japan. By an exchange of letters, after completing the examination of the revised liquor tax scheme that the Japanese Government had proposed, and after examining the proposed reduced tariff rates from the bound rates set out as a compensation for the longer implementation period, the EC confirmed that, on the basis of the agreed elements and of the integral application of some additional measures, the Japanese proposals resolved the dispute on liquor tax between the EC and Japan. Agreements on modalities for implementation, albeit partly different in their content, were subsequently concluded between Japan and the other two complainants, Canada and the United States.
80 All these agreements provided for: a) how to implement the recommendations and rulings issued by the WTO judicial organs; b) measures of appropriate compensation; c) 'additional measures' by which the parties determined to what 77 On 30 April 1997, the United States informed the Secretariat that it was withdrawing its request for the establishment of a panel in view of the fact that EC had adopted regulations implementing an agreement reached on this matter (European Communities-Duties on Imports of Grains, WT/DS13/8 of 2 May 1997). This agreement has never been notified. 78 In this sense cf. Baroncini, supra note 14, at 192. See ibid., at 196, for further analysis of the EC's relevant practice, particularly of those cases in which the text of the mutually agreed solution was not notified in line with the DSU but published in the EC Official Journal. extent the dispute might be considered settled, defined and integrated the content of obligations, and reserved procedural rights for themselves under the DSU provisions. It might, then, be contended that in these cases the overall settlement of the dispute was the result of a 'complex act', made up of the DSB ruling plus the agreement on compensation (under DSU Article 22.2), plus the agreement between parties on the modalities of implementation. The latter represents a 'creative' arrangement by which the parties agree on how to implement the DSB ruling in such a way that the dispute be considered as definitively settled. It is, in fact, notorious that, generally, where a panel or the Appellate Body finds that a measure is inconsistent with a covered agreement, they limit themselves to recommending that the Member concerned bring the measure into conformity. Pursuant to DSU Article 19.1, in fact, the WTO judicial organs 'may suggest ways in which the Member concerned could implement the recommendations'; in this case, their recommendation is not binding on the losing party.
81 Accordingly, as pointed out in the panel's ruling on the Guatemala -Antidumping Investigation case: 'In the first instance . . . the modalities of implementation of a panel, or Appellate Body, recommendation are for the Member concerned to determine'.
82
In fact, the means by which the recommendation is to be implemented 'may be suggested by a panel, but the choice of means is decided, in the first instance, by the Member concerned'.
83 Of course, it is possible that the winning party may not be satisfied with the Member's implementation. Then, the DSU provides for recourse to the dispute settlement procedures to resolve any such disagreements. Just to avoid this further recourse to DSU proceedings, parties decide to mutually agree on the modalities of implementation (thus integrating the DSB ruling).
Given their complex content, the agreements concluded in the Alcoholic Beverages case are in part infra-ordinem -as they settle the issue of compensation pursuant to DSU Article 22.2 -and in part extra-ordinem, as the possibility for the parties to the dispute to agree on the modalities of implementation of the DSB's ruling is not expressly contemplated by the DSU. On the other hand, nor are agreements on implementation prohibited by the DSU. They simply represent the exercise of the freedom accorded to the losing party to choose at its discretion the means employed to comply with the DSB ruling, possibly even concluding an agreement with the other parties to the dispute. 84 Therefore, they may be considered extra-ordinem, but perfectly lawful. According to these authors, action conforming to the suggestion will raise an irrebuttable presumption of compliance with the legal obligation. Ibid.
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If these agreements 'on implementation' were to be concluded after the adoption of authorized countermeasures, they could be considered to fall under DSU Art. 22.8.
Regarding agreements falling under DSU Article 22.8, however, an example is provided by the two previously mentioned understandings, concluded by the Community with the United States and Ecuador in the Bananas dispute. 85 Following their conclusion and implementation, in fact, the retaliatory action authorized against the Community was terminated.
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C Agreements extra-ordinem (Not Provided for by the DSU) and praeter legem (Whose Aim is to Fill the Lacunae of the DSU)
More relevant to our aim, that of disclosing the real scope of the margin of manoeuvre defended by the ECJ, are the two last categories of agreements, those without any legal basis in the DSU.
The first type, which will be dealt with in this section, mainly aims at filling in some of the deficiencies in the text and procedures provided for by the DSU. In fact, before managing to complete a formal review of dispute settlement rules and procedures required by the Uruguay Round, 87 WTO Member States developed a practice of 'creative' agreements to overcome some of the DSU flaws. This state practice, coupled with the interpretative practice developed by the WTO judicial bodies, has provided a useful basis for the intergovernmental review process, still under way. As is well known, in fact, the DSU review, which was to have concluded in October 1998, was blocked due to strong divergences among Members. The DSB, then, decided to further the review process until the end of July 1999, 88 Reverting to the silences of the DSU, it has already been noted that one of the major controversies regarding the dispute settlement procedures concerns the so-called 'sequencing conflict', i.e., the textual conflict over the interpretation of, and the relationship between, the compliance review under DSU Article 21.5 and the suspension of concessions under DSU Article 22. 90 This problem, which 'evolved into a near constitutional crisis over the systemic implications of the issues involved', 91 exploded, as stated above, in relation to the dispute concerning the EC regime on the importation of bananas. In that case, in fact, some of the complainants (the United States, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico), claimed that they would request the suspension of concessions immediately after the end of the reasonable period of time, irrespective of whether an Article 21.5 review of the new EC banana policy were undertaken (as, indeed, occurred, on the initiative of Ecuador). Accordingly, when the EC's reasonable period expired, the United States requested DSB authorization to suspend concessions. Then, the EC claimed that, if the US request were approved, 'the consequences for the multilateral dispute settlement would be grave, since the entire system is built on the premise that Members will refrain from such unilateral determinations [of non-compliance]'. 92 The United States responded that the EC's interpretation would lead to a regressus ad infinitum, namely to another compliance period following conclusion of the first review, followed by another review, another compliance period, and so on. 93 However, while the EC's position seems more in line with the spirit of the system, 94 the stand taken on this issue by the DSB in the Bananas case, 95 and subsequently by the panel in its report on the US -Import Measures case, 96 has shown a contrasting trend.
At any rate, since the DSU review has not been completed, parties involved in several subsequent cases have resorted to bilateral agreements on the 'agreed procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU', with a view to solving the 'sequencing problem'. Those agreements are mainly based on two different models. The first method, developed in such cases as Australia -Salmon, 97 and Canada -Dairy Products, 98 enables 90 the parties to initiate concurrent procedures under Articles 21.5 and 22.6. Article 22 proceedings are then suspended until the Article 21.5 procedure is ended. If, after the review process, the respondent fails to comply with the ruling, then the complainant can restart Article 22 proceedings. The second method, however, first implemented in the Australia -Leather case, 99 requires recourse to Article 21.5 review prior to initiating procedures to suspend concessions, thereby waiving the Article 22 terms. Anyhow, whether or not non-compliance is found, the losing party undertakes not to object to a retaliation request (even if the 30-day time period specified in the first sentence of the DSU Article 22.6 has expired), but only to the level of authorized suspension.
As to the European Community, it has concluded 'voluntary agreements' falling into each of these categories. With reference to the first, a good example is provided by the agreement concluded between the EC and the United States in the US -Foreign Sales Corporations case. 100 As to the second, we may refer to the understandings regarding procedures under Articles 21 and 22 of the DSU, concluded by the EC with Argentina in the follow-up of the dispute on Bovine Hides and Finished Leather, 101 and with India, in the follow-up of the Bed-linen case.
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D Agreements extra-ordinem (Not Provided for by the DSU) and contra legem
The last category in our analysis bears the most relevance to our aim of investigating the 'dark side' of the 'scope for manoeuvre' argument. Understandings contra legem, in fact, are the result of parties to a dispute freely disposing of procedural and substantial rules and, then, the obligations arising from them. These agreements clearly evidence the practical shortcomings deriving from the absence of a collective or 'public' control to eradicate WTO-wrongful conduct in the pursuit of public goods.
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A first type of contra legem understanding provides a clear example of the 'payoption', namely the losing party pays a financial compensation and thus acquires licence to continue to violate. This solution, as has been repeatedly said, is clearly in contrast with the DSU. In fact, once the recommendations and rulings are adopted by the DSB, the losing party is obliged to bring its legal system into compliance. Compensation and retaliation are both provisional tools for applying pressure and means of legal redress (albeit neither retroactive nor punitive 104 ) for the damages suffered by other parties; they are not suitable alternatives for implementation. Furthermore, no financial compensation is available in WTO law. Compensation may be fixed in terms of concessions or other obligations, but is never monetary in nature. Yet, measures of compensation are to be consistent with the WTO agreements (pursuant to DSU Article 22.1) and must be provisionally applied erga omnes, namely towards all the WTO members, not only towards those who have suffered a nullification or impairment of their benefits. In the US-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, the European Community and the United States have notified the DSB of a 'mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement', whereby the US has agreed to pay the EC $3 million in compensation over a three-year period. 105 Consultations will then be held with a view to reaching a final solution. As a result of this 'lump-sum' agreement, US WTO-inconsistent legislation (which allows the broadcasting of music in restaurants and bars without paying royalties to EC rights holders) will remain in force pending the three-year period. However, the Community has repeatedly underlined that a temporary compensation is not a substitute for full compliance, and that resolution of the dispute requires the United States to amend its WTO-inconsistent legislation. 106 Australia, on the other hand, has constantly expressed concern about the apparent discriminatory nature of the compensation arrangements agreed between the US and the Community. 107 contrary to international law. 110 Moreover, its content amounted to an infringement of the rules posed by the WTO. 111 Consequently, the EC, firstly, asked for consultations in the WTO, 112 and, then, filed a complaint against the US, formally requesting the establishment of a panel to consider the compliance of the US measures with GATT 1994 and GATS. 113 The US responded to the EU challenge by invoking the national security exception, which is part of both GATT (Article XXI) and GATS (Article XIV bis). As a result of an EC/US understanding concluded on 11 April 1997, the EU later agreed to suspend the proceedings of the WTO panel by resorting to DSU Article 12.12. 114 In return, the US administration did not undertake to abrogate or modify its contested laws, but only agreed to continue the suspension of Title III of the HelmsBurton Act and to seek a waiver of its Title IV from Congress. Both these initiatives were meant to exempt only EC companies from the most controversial aspects of the Libertad Act. 115 After further negotiations, an 'Understanding with respect to Disciplines for the Strengthening of Investment Protection' was agreed upon on 17 May 1998. 116 On this basis, the US administration undertook to ask Congress to amend Title IV of the Helms-Burton Act to give the President the Authority to make the waiver permanent in return for respect on the part of the EU of disciplines that would apply to expropriated properties (with a view to making it more difficult for EC investors to take over Cuban properties that had been illegally expropriated). Notwithstanding the commitment made by the Clinton administration, rather than granting the legislative waiver, US Congress asked for a strict implementation of Title IV, thereby showing that there was no intention to restrict extra-territorial legislation. Evidently, the US Congress took the statement made by the parties literally, namely that the 1998 Understanding was a political commitment belonging to the domain of soft law rather than that of hard law. Therefore, it was to be interpreted as conferring a moral obligation and not as imposing legal obligations. 117 Nonetheless, the vague category of 'mutually agreed solutions' envisaged by the DSU seems broad enough to encompass even this kind of agreed settlement. Otherwise, it would be relatively easy for WTO Members to eschew the obligations of compatibility and notification set up by DSU Articles 3.4 and 3.5, by simply manipulating the formal denomination of their understandings. As a matter of fact, Cuba, in reacting to the conclusion of the 1998 arrangement, defined it as an agreement falling within the WTO notion of 'mutually agreed solution'. 118 All this said, it is evident that the US and the EC, by concluding the two understandings described above, disregarded both the compatibility and the notification rules. In fact, as has been noted, 119 the 1998 Understanding mainly served to end the negative consequences deriving from a WTO-inconsistent measure only for the EC, leaving the circumstances for other states unaltered. Furthermore, even this partial objective was not attained, given that the arrangement has never become operative, and that the offending measures are still in force. 120 Finally, the agreement has never been duly notified to the DSB.
Therefore, thanks to a WTO-inconsistent mutually agreed solution, a serious policy dispute was settled outside DSU procedures, in order to allay fears that any WTO decision against the United States could provoke an anti-WTO reaction in that country, thus jeopardizing the stability of the overall system. By doing this, the EC availed itself of its rights under GATT and GATS, granting the United States the right to keep violating in exchange for promises never fulfilled. It is, therefore, by no means surprising that the parties opted for a low profile, by referring to this understanding as 'political commitments', while the EU Council only 'took note' of the decisions and statements made at the London Summit. 121 Finally, it should be recalled that compulsory notification of a mutually agreed solution is intended to prevent states from reverting to the criticized practice of 'grey area' trade restrictions, namely measures brought about under the old GATT by discriminatory and restrictive bilateral agreements establishing voluntary restrictions. 122 'Grey area' measures, often used in the past to defend the EC market, were incompatible with the GATT prohibitions of trade discrimination (under Article XIII) and non-tariff trade barriers (under Article XI.1). According to Article 11.2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards, WTO parties are now prohibited from resorting to or encouraging such measures. 123 
Final Remarks
A lesson already learned under the old GATT system is that an international organization relying for the enforcement of its rules only on complaints by its members cannot effectively prevent them from agreeing not to observe these rules in their relations. 124 According to this perspective, sovereignty and supervision are not easily reconcilable. 125 Notwithstanding the major innovations brought about by the Marrakech Agreements, the WTO has not extended the circle of those who can legitimately bring violation complaints beyond its Member Parties. The WTO, as an institution, has not been given the power to initiate propriu motu proceedings against its Members. On the other hand, WTO norms are often denied direct effect, i.e. they may not be directly invoked by private parties before the Courts. Therefore, the objective formulated with reference to the EC system by the ECJ in Van Gen en Loos, 126 namely that individuals might be involved as guardians of rule compliance by Member States, has been widely disregarded as to WTO law (with the exception of those administrative mechanisms, such as the US Section 301 or the EC Trade Barriers Regulation, according to which private parties play an indirect triggering role, being dependent on the will of the executive bodies). Lacking any form of control 'from above', by the organization, and 'from below', by private operators, transparency is the key to guaranteeing the good functioning of the only supervision mechanism provided for by the DSU, the 'horizontal' one. In a wider perspective, then, the choice of an exclusive 'horizontal' control reflects the circumstance that WTO trade obligations are still considered by their addressees as not collective (or erga omnes partes) in nature. Nor are they deemed to be directed towards the WTO as an autonomous subject, notwithstanding the fact that the multilateral system of trade regulation and dispute settlement hinges on an international organization endowed with legal personality. Instead, as has been maintained, 127 most of them remain essentially bilateral (aiming at regulating 'bundles' of bilateral relations) and not peremptory, since there is no collective or superior interest to protect (as occurs in those cases in which a 'common good' transcending the sum total of individual interests exists, such as for human rights, environmental protection or international criminal law treaties). If the above is true, then it is possible to contract out of these obligations without affecting the individual or collective rights of the other WTO parties.
The crucial question, then, is to assess whether bilateral agreements concluded as between two or a sub-group of WTO Members, with a view to effecting inter se changes or suspension of WTO rights and obligations (as happened, for instance, in the Helms-Burton or in the US-Section 110 (5) of the US Copyright Act cases), may be deemed valid between the parties, and permitted (i.e., does not give rise to responsibility for wrongful conduct).
In this regard, it should be recalled that, according to Articles 41.1 and 58.1 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, states may not stipulate inter se modifications or suspensions to a multilateral treaty when these are 'prohibited in the treaty itself' or 'affect the enjoyment by other parties of their rights under the treaty'. DSU Article 3.5 (and other DSU provisions regarding mutually agreed solutions) requests the compatibility of every solution to matters formally raised under the consultation and dispute settlement provisions with the covered agreements. It has already been noted that compatibility does not mean conformity: in between there is a slight 'scope for manoeuvre'. What happens, then, if the inter se arrangement is either WTO-incompatible or affects the rights of individual WTO parties? In these cases, we think that the derogative agreement should be considered as unlawful, and therefore not permitted, but valid, as is true for all the derogatory agreements not infringing upon rules of jus cogens.
128 Differently put, the problem is simply one of the responsibility of the participants to the derogative agreement vis-à-vis the parties of the multilateral treaty whose rights have, in any case, been affected. And here, again, the key issue is transparency. Nonetheless, if a WTO-inconsistent agreement does not become the object of a violation complaint, the problem of responsibility does not arise. In any case, the inter se 127 Much has been said on the beneficial effects of mutually agreed solutions acting as a 'safety valve' in order to defend either sovereignty or 'non-trade values' (human rights, environment, public health). 130 On the other hand, the low number of agreements contra legem found in the practice, bears out that the DSU system performs satisfactorily. This is also due to mutually agreed solutions permitted by the DSU or operating praeter legem. Nonetheless, from a theoretical point of view, the systemic characteristics described above have a direct bearing on the nature of WTO rules, 131 which are legally binding, but capable of being derogated by agreement, and therefore a source of rights and obligations that are disposable in nature.
